The Illusion of Control: The DNCC’s Misguided Rent Guideline

A few days ago, when the Dhaka North City Corporation (DNCC) authorities announced that they would take practical steps to control house rent in the capital, it brought hopes of relief in the minds of countless tenants in Dhaka. Although some new legal questions and fears of further rent hike have arisen after announcing detailed guidelines by the DNCC Administrator Mohammad Azaz on 20 January. However, the DNCC has provided explanation that rent determination will be based on negotiation and existing laws within couple of days amid extensive criticism. Earlier, in the wake of a writ petition, the High Court Division of the Supreme Court issued a rule to prepare a policy for determining house rent by the Dhaka North and South City Corporation authorities and those concerned.

Nonetheless, the purpose of the DNCC’s house rent guidelines should have been to establish some balance and fairness in an uncontrolled market. Now that has created new complications in terms of legal validity and practical applicability. The biggest concern is the provision of maintaining the existing annual rent increase rate of not more than 15 percent of the market value of the property. It will ultimately act as a license to skyrocket the rent.

Most of the instructions given by the DNCC are against the interests of both the landlords and the tenants, are chaotic, unreasonable and illegal. Although the DNCC guidelines emphasize on discussions with tenants on various issues, it does not seem that the DNCC authorities themselves discussed and took opinions from all concerned before preparing the guidelines. Even if they did, it appears that they have issued an unplanned guideline of their own accord without including those recommendations.

For example, clause 4 asserts that the landlord will give the keys of the roof and the main gate to tenants subject to conditions. But there is no guidance on what the conditions may be or what the considerations will be in determining the conditions.

Further, clause 5 of the guideline states that the tenant will pay the rent to the landlord by the 10th of the month. However, according to the House Rent Control Act, 1991, in the absence of a contract, the rent is to be paid within the fifteenth day of the following month. As a result, the legal rights of the tenants have been violated here.

Again, clause 7 provides that the time for increasing the rent will be June-July. In reality no tenant will definitely wait for the months of June-July to rent a house. In that case, if someone rents at other times of the year, the landlord cannot increase the rent if the two-year period lapse not in June-July, which is not a logical rule at all and is against the interests of the landlord.

On the other hand, clause 9 of the guidelines stipulates that a tenant can be evicted if h/se fails to pay rent on time. But section 18 of the Act has added some more grounds and clarified in which circumstances the landlord can and cannot evict a tenant. As a result, there is a fear of loss of interest of both the landlord and the tenant in this regard.

Moreover, clause 13 has gone beyond the law and determined that the landlord can take one to three months’ rent in advance. Although the Rent Control Act made it maximum of one month. Therefore, it creates opportunity to ask for an additional advance from the tenants. On the other hand, clause 15 mentions that the regional executive officer should be informed if the landlord and tenant association cannot resolve the dispute. But there is no detail about within which time limit and in what manner the dispute will be resolved. Though the regional executive officer does not have the power to resolve such dispute as per law. The law shall prevail if there is conflict between the guidelines and the law. As a result, it is not at all clear whose interests this guideline will actually protect.

On the other hand, there is no mention of how the obligations imposed on the homeowner or tenant will be ensured or held accountable, or who will take care of them. Most importantly, what will be the consequences if someone does not comply with these? And does the DNCC have any legal power or practical ability to implement this directive?

In addition, other administrative structures required to implement the guidelines are inadequate; for example, ward-based owners and tenants’ associations and the arbitration system through them are not prevalent in our system. Therefore, the possibility of arbitration being effective without clear legal provisions is low. Overall, the directive is largely advisory; its legal basis and practical implementation framework are both extremely weak.

In reality, the House Rent Control Act, 1991 is ineffective in Bangladesh. Rules have not been formulated even today; the regulatory post has been vacant for decades. Interestingly, the provision of increasing the rent by up to 15 percent yearly (after the first two years) is within section 15 of the Act and the DNCC, as a local authority, does not have the power to amend it. The main problem with the House Rent Control Act, 1991 is that there is no clear and realistic method for determining the market price. Although both the law and guidelines mention about the standard rent determination; but the detailed method and considerations for such standard rent determination is not provided.

Adopting a rational approach to rent control (such as setting realistic maximum annual percentages based on area and amenities and revising them from time to time), ensuring monitoring and accountability, establishing strong, independent and accessible dispute resolution body (such as a House Rent Tribunal or Board), awarding costs to the winning party, etc., are urgent at this moment to uphold the interest of both the homeowners and tenants.

The government should therefore now introduce a fair rent determination system that takes into account the local market analysis, the quality of the building, the amenities provided, the area, the quality of the civic services, the liveability and the income capacity of the tenant, instead of the existing ‘15% of the market value’. Additionally, bringing the necessary amendments to the House Rent Control Act, 1991 immediately; formulating rules under the Act; creating the post of rent controllers in every city corporation and municipality and appoint the necessary number of officers; establishing ward based separate dedicated body to resolve housing rental disputes; strictly implement and monitor the provisions of the law etc., are obvious now.

Dhaka’s tenants, who are one of the backbones of the city’s economy; have long been victims of neglect, deprivation and exploitation. An effective and fair rent determination requires a realistic and strong legal framework; so that the rights of both parties are specific and a speedy redressal process is within everyone’s reach. The government and the local authorities must focus on establishing a quickly implementable, balanced and transparent legal framework, not an imaginary policy. Otherwise, this guideline will remain on paper as always, and homeowners and tenants will bear the consequences. Now is the time to ensure a modern, up-to-date and humane legal protection for the housing market of the country.

Published on Dhaka Opinion Magazine as Commentary on Law on 1 February 2026.

Published on Counter Point BD as Analysis on 3 February 2026.

Wife’s ‘Consent’ vs. Arbitration Council’s ‘Permission’: Crushing the Myths Regarding Polygamy for Muslim Men in Bangladesh

In mid-January 2026, a verdict of the High Court Division (HCD) regarding polygamy created a lot of interest on social media. The photo card of the HCD verdict, which states that the permission of the first wife will no longer be required for a subsequent marriage, has been shared on Facebook massively.

There are various misconceptions about law and court systems in our country, even among many highly educated and aware people. One reason for this may be the ambiguous words and language used in the legal text and its interpretation. The language of law is usually not clear. Moreover, superior courts interpret words used in the statute. Apart from resolving disputes, interpreting legislation is also one of the core functions of the court. Therefore, the meaning of a word that we usually know in society can be given a different meaning through the interpretation by the court.

There was never a provision in the law that the permission of the first wife is needed for a second marriage; therefore, the HCD did not say anything new. Then the question may arise as to how people came to know about this misconception for a long time. It may be due to ignorance or not being able to read the law properly, or practicing a common mistake in society for a long time without verifying it.

Family matters (such as marriage, divorce, distribution of property to heirs, maintenance, dower, gift/heba, guardianship, donation of property for religious purposes, etc.) in our country are generally regulated by the rules of respective religions.

In 1961, during the regime of military ruler Ayub Khan, significant reforms were made to Muslim family laws, and the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (MFLO) was promulgated, which is still in operation in this territory. Basically, section 6 of this MFLO deals with the provision of polygamy for Muslim men. Polygamy refers to a system of ‘marriage with more than one person at once’. The opposite of polygamy is monogamy, where each person has a maximum of one spouse at any one time.

Although section 494 of the Penal Code (PC), 1860 stipulates that if a person remarries while his or her husband or wife is alive, the subsequent marriage has been declared void and that person shall be punished with imprisonment of either description up to seven years and be liable to fine. This provision is not specific to any particular religion but is applicable to everyone and is equally applicable to both men and women. Muslim law permits polygamy for men, although there is no such permission for women.

The MFLO, 1961, is a special law, while the PC is a general law. Consequently, in accordance with the general principles of law and section 3 of the MFLO, the obligations of the MFLO shall prevail over any other laws and customs prevailing in the country. Therefore, if a Muslim man wants to have multiple marriages, he will have to follow the conditions set in section 6 of the MFLO; otherwise, he will be punished.

Nevertheless, to do polygamy under Muslim law, it is mandatory to treat the existing wife/wives fairly and equitably (which includes ensuring equal treatment in terms of time, gifts, and other material things) and to have the financial capacity to provide adequate maintenance to them. But the MFLO does not say anything about these obligations of the husband for polygamy.

The court determines the application for polygamy after giving an opportunity of hearing to the existing wife and verifies the health and financial-related certificates before deciding the application for polygamy in other Islamic countries. On the other hand, the arbitration council does not have the power to call or take witnesses under the MFLO. It is worth mentioning that in 1926, Turkey and in 1957 Tunisia banned polygamy for men despite being Muslim countries. Our HCD has also previously directed the government to amend the law on polygamy.

However, there are five sub-sections in section 6 of the MFLO, 1961. The first sub-section states that a man shall not remarry while a marriage is in existence, unless he has previously obtained ‘permission in writing’ from the Arbitration Council (AC). And if a man remarries without the prior written permission of the AC, that subsequent marriage shall not be registered under the Muslim Marriage and Divorce (Registration) Act, 1974.

That means a man who has been married once, and while that marriage is in existence, cannot remarry without obtaining prior written permission from the AC. The marriage shall subsist until it is dissolved or until the death of the husband/wife. The AC is defined in Section 2(a) of the MFLO as a council consisting of the chairman and one representative each nominated by both the husband and wife or wives. If anyone fails to nominate his/her representative within the prescribed time, the AC shall be constituted without such representative.

Here, chairman means the Chairman of the concerned Union Parishad or the Mayor of the Municipality or City Corporation or the person designated by the government to perform this duty in the cantonment area or if there is no elected representative, the person/administrator appointed by the government to perform this duty (for example, there is no elected representative now). However, if a non-Muslim person is the Chairman or Mayor of a Union Parishad, Municipality or City Corporation or if a Muslim Chairman or Mayor is unable to perform his duty for any reason or if he himself applies for polygamy, the concerned Union Parishad, Municipality or City Corporation shall elect a Muslim person from among the members or commissioners to perform this duty.

Now the question is, what will be the legal consequences of that marriage if one remarries without the prior written permission of the AC? The MFLO does not clarify this issue. Therefore, it can be said that although it is a punishable offense, the subsequent marriage will not become null and void automatically. In 1997, the HCD made the same observation in Jasmine Sultana vs. Mohammad Elias, 17 BLD (1997) 4. The same verdict also directed the legislature of Bangladesh to repeal the relevant law to abolish polygamy from society. Even though the Appellate Division vehemently admonished the court and flatly dismissed the observation made by the HCD in Mohammad Elias vs. Jasmine Sultana, 19 BLD (AD) (1999) 122.

The punishment for contravening the provision is imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year (not exactly one year, but any term within one year) or a fine not exceeding ten thousand taka (i.e., any amount between one taka and ten thousand) or with both. Along with this, the punishment for not registering a marriage under section 5(4) of the Muslim Marriages and Divorces (Registration) Act, 1974 is imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a fine not exceeding three thousand taka or with both.

Section 6(2) provides the procedure for applying to the chairman. An application must be made to the chairman following the prescribed manner and by paying the prescribed fee (25 taka) and stating the ground(s) or reason(s) for the proposed marriage (e.g., sterility, physical infirmity, physical unfitness for the conjugal relation, wilful avoidance of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights, or insanity on the part of an existing wife (Rule 14 of the Muslim Family Laws Rules)) along with mentioning whether the existing wife/wives (the law does not mention the permission of the first wife, it says the existing wife or wives) have ‘consent’ (not permission) (if there are more than one wife, then all of them) in order to remarry.

Hence, according to the law, only whether the consent of the existing wife or wives has been taken has to be mentioned in the application. There is no obligation to take the permission of the existing wife or wives. The AC, if satisfied that the intended marriage is ‘necessary’ and ‘just’, may grant permission subject to fulfilment of condition(s) set by it and record in writing the reasons for such permission. However, the MFLO does not include the obligation to submit a medical or any other financial certificate in support of the application.

Therefore, it can be said that since 1961, there has never been a requirement for the wife’s permission for polygamy. Interestingly, if the consent of the wife/wives is not obtained, then there is no provision for whether the application will be rejected or there will be any other consequences for that. The punishment will only be imposed if the person remarries without the prior written permission of the AC. However, in Abul Basher v Nurun Nabi, 39 DLR (1987) 333, the court observed that the aim of section 6 was to restrain the practice of polygamy and to permit it in reasonable scenarios. Hence, the consent of the existing wife/wives is not a sine qua non for remarriage.

If the husband or wife/wives are aggrieved by the decision of the AC, they can file an application in the prescribed manner, within the prescribed time, and by paying the prescribed fee for revision to the concerned Civil Judge, while the decision of the Civil Judge will be final (s. 6(4)). However, a writ petition can be filed against this judgment before the HCD.

Now the question is, what is the remedy for the existing wives/wives if a man marries polygamously without the prior written permission of the AC? In that case, the existing wife/wives will have the right to get their outstanding dower immediately in full (regardless of the mode of payment). Moreover, if there is no delegation of power to dissolve the marriage in the Nikahnama, the wife can proceed for dissolution of the marriage through court under section 2(iia) of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, by showing the ground of such polygamy without taking permission from the AC.

An important question in this regard is whether the groom is obliged to inform the bride that he is already married and has an existing wife at the time of the subsequent marriage? There is no legal provision for that earlier disclosure. Although clause 5 of the Nikahnama asks whether the bride is a maiden, widow, or divorced woman? But there is no such clause for men, which is discriminatory. Nonetheless, section 495 of the PC prescribes that if anyone conceals the fact of an existing marriage while committing an offence under section 494, he will be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.

So, public legal literacy campaigns are essential to eliminate misconceptions about law and legal processes. The government should take meaningful initiative to ease existing barriers to access to legal information, whereas NGOs, different civil society platforms, human rights organisations, legal academics, and law students can engage in the dissemination of accurate legal information to sensitise citizens about their legally protected rights. Such endeavours will empower individuals with appropriate legal knowledge.

Published in the Bonik Barta as Sub-editorial on 14 January 2026.

Published in the Weekly Shampratik Deshkal and Deshkal News on 15 January 2026 on page 7.

Published on the Counterpoint BD as Analysis on 20 January 2026.

From Paper to Practice: Can the Law Stop Animal Cries and Whimpers in Bangladesh?

Newspaper reports on 2 December in Bangladesh stated that, approximately a week ago a stray mother dog gave birth to eight puppies in the courtyard of the government residence of Hasnur Rahman Nayon, the Ishwardi upazila officer of the Small Farmers Development Foundation and had been sheltering there with her newborns.

Later, the puppies suddenly disappeared. On the morning of December 1, the mother dog was seen running around the parishad premises, whimpering loudly looking for the newborn puppies. It was eventually discovered that the puppies had been thrown into a pond and killed. Later, the dead puppies recovered from the pond and buried. The incident has stirred the minds of all conscientious citizens across the country and abroad.

Subsequently, on December 2, the Ishwardi Upazila Livestock Officer filed a case under under Section 7 of the Animal Welfare Act, 2019  (although a few newspaper reports mentioned quoting Ishwardi Police Station Officer-in-Charge ASM Abdun Noor that the case was filed under section 429 of the Penal Code of 1860) at the local police station when the advisor of the Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock ordered her to take necessary action. As a result, the wife of the Upazila Small Farmers Foundation official was arrested the next day while the Senior Judicial Magistrate Court-1 ordered to send her to jail. Later, on 4 December, volunteer organisation Ishwardiyan’s director and an animal lover Shahriar Amit brought two puppies from his own dog and gave them to the grieving mother.

Now the question is why cruelty to animals is not decreasing despite the existence of an enactment titled the Animal Welfare Act passed in the parliament in 2019. If we look at history, it is seen that before the 2019 law, a century old law called ‘the Cruelty to Animals Act’ of 1920 was in force in this land; which was amended to prevent cruelty to animals, show kind treatment and ensure animal welfare through responsible husbandry, which is also mentioned in the preamble of the new law. Although the 2019 law is progressive compared to the former 1920 law; there are several significant loopholes in this law. And therefore, this newly enacted law is also unable to ensure prevention of cruelty to animals, show kind treatment, responsible husbandry and protection of all animals in the country.

A vital limitation of the 2019’s Act is that no court can take cognizance of any offence committed under this Act without a written complaint from the authority under section 18. Hence, there is no scope for any citizen or aggrieved person to file a case or seek redress under this Act. According to the Act, the authority means the Director General of the Department of Livestock or any veterinary surgeon of the said Department authorized by him (Section 2(4)). Therefore, no one can directly file a case under this Act to seek redress; at most, can file a GD with the police station concerned. Instead of filing a case, any person who wants to take legal action has to approach the Department of Livestock and in these cases, unnecessary time is wasted, and various harassments are seen due to countless bureaucratic complications culture in the country. Unless there is a stir on social media or there is video of occurrence or no responsible person takes initiative, usually no action is taken in these cruel cases.

Thus, the real purpose of animal welfare is limited to the statute, not seen in reality in Bangladesh. And that is why in most cases, citizens are forced to file cases under the Penal Code, 1860 by passing the Animal Welfare Act. Section 429 of the Penal Code provides that if anyone kills or harms an animal and if the value of any animal is 50 taka or upwards, that person shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years or with fine or with both.

On the contrary, the Animal Welfare Act prescribes punishment depending on the nature and extent of the crime including someone accomplices in the commission of the crime, which may enlarged to 2 (two) years of simple imprisonment or with a fine which may extend to 50 (fifty) thousand taka or with both. The crime committed under this Act is non-cognizable and bailable. Though, the offence committed under section 429 of the Penal Code is cognizable, meaning that the police can arrest the accused without a warrant, but the offence is also a bailable offence. Therefore, it is not clear why the accused was sent to jail without bail.

However, the complication of filing a case for cruelty against animals under the Penal Code is that if the animal is not owned by anyone, then determining the monetary value stated in the Code is not possible. In that case, it becomes difficult to prove such a case before the court. As a result, many of these cases do not progress to trial, rather settled between parties or dismissed for lack of evidence. Nonetheless, the Animal Welfare Act makes killing both owned and unowned animals a crime. Moreover, no stray animal can be killed, culled, removed, relocated without the reasons mentioned in the Act.

Cruel, violent and inhumane treatment of animals is not a new phenomenon in the context of Bangladesh although there are excepts but the numbers are insignificant. It is true that people's interest and awareness towards animal welfare have increased compared to before, it has not yet reached the desired level. Due to which there are often reports of animals being killed by groups or individuals. In some cases, even local authorities lead these killings. Though in 2020, the country's highest court ruled a ban on dog culling after filing a writ petition by a private animal welfare organization. As a result, the Dhaka City Corporation forced to stop dog culling and promised to implement a neutering and vaccination programme for neighbourhood dogs. However, vaccination programs have not spread throughout the country, resulting in a kind of fear of dogs among a significant number of people. Moreover, there are a lack of budget, training, initiative, coordination, etc., for such programme.

Again, while confinement of animals through conventional zoos around the world is being gradually eradicated, in our country, planning and investment in this regard is not visible. Rather, news of importing new animals to Dhaka Zoo is often reported. In the meantime, it was reported that a lion in the zoo left its cage on December 5. Although this incident did not bring any sad news, the lion's decrepit health has saddened animal lovers.

The hope is that in addition to the news of the arrest in the puppies killing incident on December 3, another report covered an event that distribute compensation cheques to the affected people by wild elephants in Anwara, Chattogram while the Banshkhali range officer of the forest department said that elephants are the guests of the locals. Therefore, even if the guests come and eat the crops, the locals should not harm the elephants. The government will compensate the crops. So, from now on, no one should harm any elephants. At that event, 11 people were given compensation of Tk 4.35 lakh. This is undoubtedly a commendable initiative by the Forest Department. More such initiatives are expected to be taken in the country for animal welfare.

A different report published on the same day disclosed that fur (materials made from animal fur) has now been banned on the New York Fashion Week. Although this rule will be effective from September 2026. However, it is hoped that this decision will help American designers think more deeply about animals from now on. Earlier, London Fashion Week banned the use of fur from 2018.

On January 14, 2010, the then cabinet approved the proposal to change the Bangla name of the Ministry of Fisheries and Animal Resources and various departments under it, introducing Prani instead of Pashu to show more sensitivity, and although the Animal Welfare Act was enacted in the country in 2019, brutality has not yet been eliminated from society. Although the existing Animal Welfare Act, 2019, is an important start to prevent cruelty against animals, it is still clearly incapable and insufficient to address real challenges.

The Constitution of Bangladesh recognizes the protection and improvement of environment and biodiversity as the responsibility of the state. Now it is high time for the state to fulfill that responsibility. The law cannot be limited to paper rules and regulations; rather, the legal rights of all animals in the country must be ensured on the basis of human values ​​and justice. Because one of the criteria for measuring the moral progress of the citizens of the country is their kind and humane behavior towards innocent, voiceless and helpless animals. Therefore, immediate state initiatives and practical actions to ensure animal welfare, such as necessary reforms of the existing legislature, proper enforcement, rescue and rehabilitation, changes the concept of the traditional zoo, coordination among authorities, enough shelter for stray animals, adequate budget, awareness, initiatives, campaign, outreach and education on kindness and necessity towards animals, will help in instilling love for animals in the minds of people and will prevent the recurrence of such brutal incidents.

Published in Dhaka Tribune as Long Read (Op-ed) on 10 December 2025 on page 5.

Published in New Age as Lead Op-ed on 12 December 2025 on page 8.

 Published as Op-ed on Daily Bonik Barta (Online Version) on 12 December 2025.

Published as Sub-editorial in Ajker Patrika on 4 January 2026 on page 4.

The Punished Pardon: Can an Approver be Penalised?

The International Crimes Tribunal (ICT)-1 has delivered the first verdict for crimes against humanity committed during the July uprising recently, while ousted Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and former Home Minister Asaduzzaman Khan were sentenced to death. Although another accused and subsequently considered as an approver under the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act (ICTA), 1973, in the same case, Ex-Inspector General of Police (IGP) Chowdhury Abdullah Al-Mamun was sentenced to five years in prison despite being convicted of the same crime.

Chowdhury Abdullah Al-Mamun's sentence has created a topic of discussion in the country. A report in Prothom Alo says that the family members of the July martyrs are not happy to accept the lenient punishment of only five years in prison. The families have demanded that he be sentenced to at least life imprisonment. On the other hand, some in the legal community believe that he should have been acquitted as an approver under the law.

Section 15 of the ICTA deals with the provision of ‘approver’ although the Act does not provide any definition to it, and the term is used as heading/marginal note of the mentioned section. The Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), 1898 also neither defined nor used the term, but it is usually applied to a person, supposed to be directly or indirectly concerned in or privy to an offence, to whom a pardon is granted under section 337 of the Code with a view to securing his testimony against other persons guilty of the offence. In cases in which a pardon is tendered under the CrPC, the intended approver should always be made clearly informed of the extent of the pardon offered to him; it should be explained to him that he is being tendered a pardon and will not be prosecuted in respect of such and such a case, and no others. Former police chief Chowdhury is the first person declared as approver under the Act, and that is why his lenient penalty creates debate regarding its suitability.

As per media reports, during the charge hearing, the tribunal asked him whether he was guilty or innocent. At that moment, the former IGP pleaded guilty and said, "I plead guilty. I am willing to voluntarily disclose the truth and details of all the circumstances related to the case." Consequently, the tribunal granted his plea and treated him as an approver for the case. Since then, he has been turned into a prosecution witness and gave crucial evidence. The vital legal question now arises whether a prosecution witness, who was an accused in the case, should be awarded a harsh sentence or be acquitted if the conditions are fulfilled.

According to media sources, the Chief Prosecutor of the Tribunal said about the fate of the approver earlier and opined that it is the exclusive jurisdiction, while the tribunal can pardon him if a full and true disclosure of the crime is revealed through his testimony or make any other order. The conditions for such pardon outlined in the law are i) full (not partial), ii) true (not fabricated) disclosure about the iii) whole (not in part) of the circumstances by the approver.

In this case, the ICT pronounced that the former Police chief’s role/contribution/confession/cooperation in proving the charges in the case as an approver were taken into consideration, which indicates that he has fulfilled the conditions. Because of that, he has been awarded a lighter punishment than his co-accused, although the tribunal convicted Sheikh Hasina, Asaduzzaman Khan and Chowdhury Mamun for instigation, incitement, issuing order to mass killing, offences under superior command responsibility, and joint criminal enterprise.  

Another question is whether there is any exception when the tribunal can inflict punishment to the approver. The answer is if the approver does not fulfil the above conditions, then the pardon will be revoked. In that case, the approver can be tried for the original offense for which s/he was pardoned, and his/her own confession/statement given as part of the pardon process can be used against him/her in that trial. Moreover, punishment can also be given if the approver is found to have committed a different crime that is not covered by the pardon. Hence, the pardon offered under S. 15 does not provide blanket immunity for all criminal activities of the approver.

The complexity does not end here. Now the question is, what does the word pardon mean as used in the law? Does it mean acquittal or a lesser punishment than what should have been given? It requires an interpretation from the court to avoid confusion. However, section 26 of the ICTA has overriding effect over all other laws, including the CrPC and the Evidence Act of the country.

Nonetheless, if we scrutiny into international criminal law jurisprudence then we will see Article 65 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court provides a framework for proceedings on an admission of guilt where the tribunal is not bound by the admission and must satisfy itself that: i) the accused understands the nature and consequences of the admission, ii) the admission is made voluntarily after sufficient consultation with defense counsel and such admission is supported by the facts of the case, based on the charges, any evidence presented by the prosecutor, and any other materials presented by the accused. 

Nevertheless, it is clear in the Rome Statute that the accused remains accused not turn into a prosecution witness, and the Chamber may convict the accused even if the accused satisfies the above requirements. Hence, there is no scope for a predetermined or lenient sentence for an admission under Article 78. In addition, the Guidelines for Agreements Regarding Admission of Guilt adopted by the ICC heavily emphasize the Court's independent duty to establish the truth. Judges must examine not just the agreement between the parties, but also other evidence presented by the prosecutor and any other evidence, which can include victim representations and other sources, to ensure the facts are complete. Besides, the Guidelines explicitly recognize the need for victims to be informed of the proceedings and to be able to present their views and concerns, ensuring the process does not overlook their interests.

In contrast, the statutes and rules of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) contained provisions for formal plea agreements under Rules 62 ter of the ICTY and 62 bis of the ICTR. An accused could plead guilty to specific charges, often after negotiations with the prosecutor, who might agree to drop other counts or recommend a sentence. However, the Trial Chamber was not bound by the agreement. Judges had to verify that the plea was voluntary, informed, and unequivocal and that a sufficient factual basis for the crimes existed. In these cases, a convicted person received a sentence determined by the judges, with a guilty plea being a significant mitigating factor, often leading to a substantially reduced term.

To understand the issue of pardon in international criminal jurisprudence, we should further look into the primary goals of international criminal law and tribunals are not just to punish, but to establish a historical record of atrocities, promote reconciliation, deter future crimes, whereas a unilateral pardon could undermine these goals by appearing to offer impunity. Sentences are meant to reflect the individual's guilt and the gravity of the crime, while a pardon would circumvent this carefully calibrated judicial process. Hence, someone like Mr Mamun, who was a superior as the police chief, is criminally liable for crimes against humanity, and a complete pardon or acquittal is incompatible with the core principle of individual criminal responsibility for international atrocities, which seeks to eliminate impunity.

Now the question is, was he punished without getting the opportunity for a fair trial? How can a prosecution witness be punished without violating the conditions? Or did he get a chance to call witnesses on his behalf? Did he get chance to cross-examine the witnesses brought against him? Or was he sentenced based on the guilt pleaded at the beginning of the trial?

Although there is now some confusion about these issues, it is clear that despite repeated amendments, there are still many ambiguities and loopholes in our ICT Act and the law has not yet reached international standards. Due to these legal ambiguities and weaknesses, there is now an opportunity to question the trial process and punishment of Chowdhury Abdullah Al-Mamun. In particular, the provisions related to the approver did not follow either the prevailing law in the country or international standards. As a result, this punishment could not pass the criteria of fairness in any aspect. As a result, justice may now be obstructed, and it has created an opportunity to question the integrity and fairness of the overall trial process.

Published in the Bonik Barta as Sub-editorial on 21 November 2025 on page 4.

Published on the Prothom Alo (Online Version) on 22 November 2025 as Opinion.

Published on The Daily Star (Online Version) on 5 December 2025.

Crashing the AI Hype and Myth in Courtroom

It seems Artificial Intelligence (AI) is revolutionizing human functions in different industries. Legal industry is not an exception to that and is already affected by AI fever in several countries to bring positive changes to the traditional legal profession. It applies to streamlining legal processes in courts, analysing legal instruments, and is even being used in certain jurisdictions to predict and prescribe outcomes. 

Definitely, there are advantages to using these powerful modern algorithmic tools. However, the adverse aspects of AI are being washed away by the wave of its emerging use whereas mostly the positive features are being discussed widely. This write up aims to shed light on some of the ignored limitations of AI tools to make readers aware of the potential consequences of reliance on AI in the legal proceedings.

AI is actually a prediction tool by nature. Huge historical data are used to train AI powered tech tools and from there it learns to identify probabilistic patterns. As a result, it in fact doesn’t reason, think or question like human being although its output looks convincing and can mimic human style of reasoning. Yet a great prevailing concern is sometimes it generate false information which apparently looks authoritative.

It even doesn’t understand human language while it merely forecast the next token in a given sequence of words. So, it cannot rectify previous human error rather comes with its own set of biases which stem from the training data and subsequently reinforce them.

Law, legal proceedings and legal profession aren’t just about rules rather they are about people as well, as they deal with the problems of people. Moreover, law is neither mathematics nor a formula to be mechanically inserted into a scientific system. It is beyond that; a living and ever-changing matter that evolves with societal values, cultural norms, and ethical considerations. On the contrary, AI systems do not have the emotional empathy, ethical judgment, and human intuition, authority and experience that reflect societal values and mandatory for the legal profession.

Every case is different and so do all legal professionals i.e. counsels, judges, magistrates, court staff. Human lawyers not only apply law in court cases, but they also have skills to adopt with the judges and court environment. Accordingly, they adjust their responsibilities to the court, respond to the mood, tone, and dynamics of the moment. And here AI fails to assess the situation while human is champion in doing that.

Alongside, there is valid justification why every case is judged on its own facts cautiously. Because public need to feel justice is being done justly. There is high risk that dropping people's problem to algorithm may create barrier between public and the judicial process.

In the age of AI, there is a growing trend of representing own case to the court with the assistance of AI. Self represented litigation is gaining popularity as it saves the cost of lawyer as AI chatbot does not charge you for legal advice. Despite that, it won’t argue for you when the judge asks a question or seeks clarification during hearing. In addition, it won’t object to improper cross examination or if you’re being treated unfairly in the court. Apart from these, court is like a playground where the other side might pull a manoeuvre suddenly. Hence, you need to think promptly and make judgment calls on the spot what AI is not able to provide in self represented cases.

Furthermore, as of today, AI does not take responsibility for any wrongdoing, neither its programmer nor the company who trade it. No AI chatbot will stay beside you when the court penalize you for their fault. Recently, the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) of the UK warned to lawyers about the use of AI, after finding that a British Bangladeshi Barrister had misled the tribunal by citing a fictitious Court of Appeal judgment generated by ChatGPT. The lawyer is also referred to the Bar Standards Board of the UK for investigation. Several other lawyers across jurisdictions also faced criticism and punishment from courts and regulatory bodies for referring to ChatGPT generated false information in real cases to the court. Thus, it’s you who are responsible for employing AI in your profession or case without knowing its limitation and having proper training on its design.

The role of the judiciary is not just to process cases efficiently but to weigh moral consequences, to ensure justice fairness, and to uphold the rule of law in a way that no machine can replicate. Therefore, we must draw a line between the application and use of AI generated outputs and our own conscience in complex, sophisticated and life related incidents resolved in courtroom.

Published in the Law & Our Rights Page of The Daily Star on 22 October 2025. 

Published in the Weekly Sampratik Deshkal on 23 October 2025 at page 7.

Published in the Ajker Patrika as Sub-editorial on 22 December 2025 on page 4. 

Don’t Disconnect Democracy Through the Scope of Internet Shutdown in Bangladesh

In the aftermath of the July Uprising, people hope that the government will strictly comply with internationally recognised legal standards and ensure the right to the internet. But the laws regulating internet communications remains concerning. During the July Uprising, the country endured a deliberate, nationwide internet blackout for five consecutive days, along with a 10-day mobile internet shutdown — a move intended to suppress the uprising. 

Moreover, the then-government wielded unchecked authority to disrupt or throttle internet access, frequently imposing outages without justification or legal basis. Despite these premeditated and systematic shutdowns, officials repeatedly denied any involvement.

Then, the SpaceX-owned Starlink satellite internet gained significant attention. At the time, expatriates mistakenly used the hashtag #Starlink, urging the restoration of internet access in Bangladesh — despite the fact that the service had not yet begun operations in the country.

On 19 February, the Chief Adviser (CA) of the current Interim Government Dr Yunus formally invited Elon Musk to inaugurate Starlink's satellite internet service within the next 90 days.

The initial discussions about introducing Starlink's services have raised hopes among the public that it could put an end to arbitrary internet shutdowns imposed at the government's discretion. As a satellite-based system, Starlink could provide uninterrupted connectivity, even during natural disasters and crises.

The CA's press secretary reiterated this expectation in a statement following the invitation to Elon Musk, emphasising that the primary reason for launching Starlink in Bangladesh is to permanently prevent future internet shutdowns.

Moreover, the Awami League government was also notorious for unlawful wiretapping, even leaking private phone conversations to the public. Consequently, there is now a pressing demand for a modern, resilient and alternative connectivity solution — one that operates independently of traditional internet infrastructure.

The public had expected that the interim government, formed in the wake of the July Uprising, would strictly comply with internationally recognised legal standards — refraining from enacting laws that permit wiretapping without warrants, politically motivated internet shutdowns, or the abuse of executive power, as seen under the previous administration.

However, concerns remain. Both the draft Telecommunication Law and the Regulatory and Licensing Guidelines for Non-Geostationary Orbit (NGSO) Satellite Services Operators in Bangladesh, prepared by the BTRC for Starlink, retain provisions allowing state-mandated wiretapping and internet restrictions. 

Faiz Ahmad Taiyeb, the Chief Adviser's Special Assistant for the Ministry of Post, Telecommunication, and Information Technology, has acknowledged the legality of wiretapping for state security — though he insists the government has no intention of imposing internet shutdowns and pledges legal amendments. He further asserts that Starlink is unlikely to oppose such measures.

Internet shutdowns violate fundamental rights, obstructing universal access, sustainable development, freedom of expression, and the right to information, assembly, economic security, education, and healthcare. Uninterrupted connectivity remains critical for political parties, activists, and marginalised communities to mobilise, amplify their voices, expose injustices, and hold authorities accountable.

In 2016, the United Nations (UN) formally recognised internet access as a fundamental human right, a stance reinforced in 2021 when the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) adopted a non-binding resolution on the promotion, protection, and enjoyment of human rights online. Bangladesh, alongside 42 other nations, endorsed this resolution, which urges states to: "refrain from imposing—and to lift existing—restrictions on the free flow of information, in violation of Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). This includes practices such as internet shutdowns, online censorship, media bans, and the criminalisation of free expression."

Despite this, governments continue to justify outages under the guise of 'public interest', 'national security', or 'public order' — though such measures often serve as tools of repression, enabling authoritarian regimes to silence dissent and suppress protests.

The ramifications of shutdowns on human rights can be severe and extensive. State censorship and surveillance through the internet and telecommunications have a detrimental impact on the human right to seek, receive, and disseminate information. 

However, access to the internet can be obstructed through various other ways including high prices, inadequate infrastructure, restriction or ban on certain sites, throttled speed, limiting mobile services to 2G transfer speeds, content moderation, temporary blockage of social media etc.

Hence, international human rights instruments and standards uniformly reject internet shutdowns as a means of information control. Restricting access via a partial or complete internet blackout is characterised as indiscriminate and disproportionate restrictions. Any restrictions on information dissemination systems must comply with the three-part tests for restrictions on freedom of expression, i.e., legality, legitimacy and proportionality. The responsibility to justify the tests is with the state attempting to limit the rights.

The legality principle provides that any restriction must be provided by law and perhaps that is why Bangladesh is also interested in keeping a scope in the law. However, the law must be concisely drafted, and it must be accessible to the public. The law should mandate strict oversight over the scope of such restriction and facilitate a forum for judicial review to prevent any misuse. 

Additionally, the law must clearly specify the extent of discretion granted to public bodies and the manner of executing the discretion. Therefore, the proposed law must fulfil these criteria, as if a law fails to explicitly explain the relevant circumstances and conditions for Internet shutdowns, it is detrimental for human rights.

The legitimacy rule stipulates any limitation on freedom of expression and other rights safeguarded by international law must aim to achieve a reasonable objective consistent with the identified grounds and be essential for attaining that objective.

When states implement internet shutdowns or interrupt access to communication platforms, the legal basis for their actions is mostly undefined. A 2022 report of the OHCHR on Internet shutdowns identified that the official justification for the shutdowns was inexplicable in 228 instances across 55 countries from 2016 to 2021.

Finally, the proportionality criteria prescribe that a restriction must be the least intrusive alternative and must not undermine the substance of the right.  An appropriate evaluation of the efficacy of the restrictions and the danger of excessive blocking is to be made. This evaluation should ascertain whether the restriction may result in a disproportionate prohibition of access to the Internet or specific content and whether it represents the least restrictive method to achieve the stated lawful objective.

Due to the arbitrary and extensive effects, internet shutdowns hardly satisfy the proportionality criterion. The duration and geographical extent may differ; however, shutdowns are typically excessive. Shutdowns not only curtail the right to expression but also interfere with other fundamental rights as they impact on citizens many essential activities and services.

The draft BTRC guideline requires that all satellite data transfer via local gateways linked to the country's International Internet Gateway (IIG), which weakens one of satellite internet's principal advantages: its autonomy from national infrastructure. This rule may result in government-mandated shutdowns affecting even satellite subscribers, as occurred earlier. Further, the draft guideline creates an obligation for the licensee to supply the National Telecommunication Monitoring Centre (NTMC) or the BTRC with any necessary information related to surveillance. Nevertheless, Starlink's launch to the Bangladeshi market should prioritise individual privacy and limit governmental interference and surveillance.

The legal acknowledgement of Internet access as a human right by the UN is regrettably inadequate to motivate behavioural change of our authorities. After the sacrifice of students and the public, it is high time for a more actionable, realistic, and effective way of securing Internet access. Hence, the authority concerned should urgently review the draft law and guideline containing provisions for shutting down the internet. 

Moreover, the government must ensure that the new law meets the above criteria to prevent political gain or abuse of power. Besides, the regulators must adopt a smarter, future-proof approach and embrace innovation instead of packing outdated telecom law in a new guise to disrupt emerging technologies. 

Published in The Business Standard on 6 April 2025.

A concise version has been published on The Oxford Human Rights Hub Blog on 18 April 2025.